DMZ

International Forum on the Peace Economy
평화경제 국제포럼

August 29, 2019, 16:35 - 18:30
Hotel President (31F, Schubert Hall)

[Parallel Session I]
Politics, Diplomacy and Security

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[Parallel Session I]
Politics, Diplomacy and Security

The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States

Overview

Title	DMZ International Forum on the Peace Economy Parallel Session I - Politics, Diplomacy and Security
Date & Time	August 29, 2019, 16:35 - 18:30
Venue	Hotel President (31F, Schubert Hall)
Organizer	Korea Institute of Public Administration
Theme	**The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States**

The Moon Jae-in administration is actively promoting a new vision, "Inclusive Korea for the Commonwealth", after declaring the year 2019 as the first year to initiate the vision of "Inclusive Korea" and announcing the "Inclusive nation social policy promotion plan". The "Innovative, Inclusive Korea" would pursue qualitative growth rather than a quantitative growth, while aiming to create a society of coexistence, instead of allowing exclusion and monopoly. In order to achieve an "Innovative, Inclusive Korea", the Government advocates welfare, a fair economy, and inclusive growth in which the resulting gains are distributed equally to everyone and income increases among mid- to low-income earners. Furthermore, it is essential to pursue values beyond our society and internal affairs such as engagement policy toward North Korea, peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula, and embracing globalization. The objective of the KIPA session, "the Future of Innovative, Inclusive States" is to introduce cases and core values of "government inclusiveness" in Switzerland, the United States, and South Korea, and discuss a wide range of challenges and strategies to achieve an "Innovative and Inclusive nation".

Program

Time		Program
16:35 - 17:50	75'	**[Facilitator]** **AHN Seong Ho** President, Korea Institute of Public Administration *Republic of Korea* **[Presentations]** **Ideal Civil Servants: Are there Eastern and Western Traditions?** **Jos C.N. RAADSCHELDERS** Professor / Associate Dean, John Glenn College of Public Affairs, The Ohio State University *U.S.A.* **The Federal System of Switzerland - A Promoter of Innovation and Inclusiveness** **Reiner EICHENBERGER** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Fribourg *Switzerland* **Status of Inclusive States in Theory of the State and Implementation Strategies** **EUN Jaeho** Vice President, Korea Institute of Public Administration *Republic of Korea*
17:50 - 18:25	35'	**[Discussants]** **MIN Jin** Honorary Professor, Public Administration, Korea National Defense University *Republic of Korea* **KIM Jung Hai** Head, Government Research Bureau, Korea Institute of Public Administration *Republic of Korea* **LEE Changwon** Senior Research Fellow, Korea Labor Institute *Republic of Korea*
18:25 - 18:30	5'	**Photo Session**

Politics, Diplomacy and Security
The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States

Facilitator

AHN Seong Ho

President
Korea Institute of Public Administration

Republic of Korea

Dr. AHN Seong Ho is an expert in the field of decentralization and local autonomy, and has been contributed to advisory committees, civil society, and academia for decentralization and balanced national development.

Dr. AHN Seong Ho currently serves as a Chair of the Sejong-Jeju Balanced Development of Autonomy and Decentralization Special Committee, and Commissioner of Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, Division of Decentralization Development.

Dr. AHN Seong Ho, particularly, devoted his study and research on autonomy, decentralization and balanced national development at the Korean Association for Public Administration, Seoul Association for Public Administration, Korean Association for Local Government Studies etc. He received Master and Ph.D. in Public Administration at Seoul National University. Now, he is a president of Korea Institute of Public Administration.

DMZ
International Forum on the Peace Economy
평화경제 국제포럼

Ideal Civil Servants:
Are there Eastern and Western Traditions?

Presentation

Jos C.N. RAADSCHELDERS

Professor / Associate Dean
John Glenn College of Public Affairs
The Ohio State University

U.S.A.

Jos C.N. RAADSCHELDERS is professor, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, and Faculty Director of Professional Development and Training Programs at the John Glenn College of Public Affairs, The Ohio State University. He is also affiliated as professor at the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands.

His research focuses on the nature of the study of public administration, the position and role of government in society, administrative history, comparative government, and civil service systems. He has published 150 articles and books chapters, 50 book review essays, and (co-)authored and (co-) edited multiple smaller and larger books.

His teaching concerns nowadays mainly overviews of the role and position of government in society, but he has taught a wide range of courses in the study of public administration since 1983. Since the mid-1980s, he has developed and offered custom-made programs for public servants from various countries across the globe (elected officeholders, career civil servants, diplomats, military, police).

He has a BA in history and textiles (including a degree in history of art) from Teachers College, Delft, the Netherlands (1979), an MA in History with minors in public administration and international relations, University of Leiden, the Netherlands (1982), and a Ph.D. in the Social Sciences, University of Leiden (1990).

He served as Managing Editor of Public Administration Review (2006-2011) and is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. Before coming to the John Glenn College, he worked at the Department of Public Administration, University of Leiden (1983-1998), and the Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma (1998-2011).

Politics, Diplomacy and Security

The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States

Ideal Civil Servants:
Are there Eastern and Western Traditions?

Abstract

In comparative civil service research the Western, Weberian ideal typical definition of bureaucracy as organization and as personnel system is frequently contrasted with the Eastern, Confucian conceptualization of the ideal civil servant. In this paper it is argued that this contrast is only possible when attention is limited to the present. When, however, ethical traditions as well as the ancient Near Eastern instruction and wisdom literature is considered it is clear that the conception of the ideal civil servant is almost universal, namely focused on inner morality, practical skills, and respect for the rule of law. The contemporary civil servant who works in a democratic political system is also expected to be a policy bureaucrat, but the extent to which such is possible very much depends upon national culture and not simply on civil service reform.

Ideal Civil Servants: Are there Eastern and Western Traditions?

Eastern and Western public and civil service traditions are frequently contrasted with an eye on fit in the institutional arrangements of political-administrative functions in the larger society. This contrasting suggests that there are different cultural perspectives upon what constitutes an ideal civil servant. Is there an ideal civil servant? The existing literature on civil service traditions on the one hand and on public sector ethics on the other suggests that the ideal civil servant is conceptualized differently in the Confucian and Weberian traditions. In this paper I challenge the notion that Confucian and Weberian conceptions are fundamentally different. That is, at the surface they appear different, but both are grounded in the same and very ancient desire for reliable, trustworthy, and knowledgeable civil servants.

To contrast Confucian and Weberian conceptions of civil servants is actually a simplification of a rather complex set of desired attitudes and behaviors. In the stereotypical contrast, Confucian scholarship and reflections is then regarded as emphasizing the moral content of bureaucratic behavior and civil service action and discretion, while Weberian scholarship stresses functional behaviors and actions in the context of more (i.e. *Rechtsstaat* concept) or less (i.e., *public interest* concept) formal institutional arrangements that frame and constrain behavior. However, at least two Korean scholars (Kim 2012; Im 2013) and two American scholars (Rarick 2007; Tao 2018) suggest that Confucian and Weberian perspectives are, deep-down, not that different, if at all.

First, I will briefly discuss (stereo)types of civil servants (section 1), followed by a conceptual framework for characterizing and conceptualizing civil servants that aspires to transcend the rather superficial cultural differences between Confucian and Weberian approaches (section 2). I will then briefly present what some ethical traditions have to say about ideal civil servants (section 3). These ethical traditions outline what is considered good and just behavior in human society, and, thus, includes reflections upon the position and role of government in achieving what is considered good and just. From this, one can infer what behaviors of civil servants are considered acceptable and desirable. Indeed, they find that there are significant similarities between the two perspectives, and in this sense nothing is offered in this paper that has not been said before. However, what has been missing in the public administration literature is that what is regarded as desirable and acceptable behavior of civil servants may actually be rooted in the so-called instruction or wisdom literature of the ancient world, especially Pharaonic Egypt (section 4). That ancient advice about the proper conduct of public servants is visible in the ethical traditions touched upon in section three. As it is, both the Confucian and Weberian "traditions" are visible in the reform-minded ideas of Yu Hyŏngwŏn, a Korean scholar (1622 – 1672) who wrote about what could and should be improved in the statecraft of the late Chosŏn Kingdom (section 5). In section 6, I will briefly discuss why ideas about what constitutes an ideal civil servant emerge in human societies. Finally, in section 7 attention is given to the fact that comments concerning desired behaviors and actions of public officials have, from the beginning, aimed at calling upon humanity's higher inclinations, and that element was later augmented with attention for practical skills and the role of law. The first element of the ideal civil servant, morality, is thus Near Eastern in origin; the second and third elements, practical skills and attention for rule of law, is Far Eastern in origin. These Near Eastern and Far Eastern origins somehow found their way to the Mediterranean ancient world. Under democracy, a fourth element becomes important: that of the policy developing, pro-active civil servant and that originates in the Western world.

1. Some Thoughts on Images and Typologies of Bureaucrats and Civil Servants

For millennia the face of government is that of the ruler, the religious leaders, the military commanders, the tax collectors, the overseers (of whatever). Government exists to support the ruling elite. They protect the territory from internal and external instability through the judicial, policing, and taxation functions they control. Those working in government do so as personal servants to the ruler and/or ruling elite. The large majority of the population are mere subjects, providing resources in labor, kind, and money to the regime in power. This is the case throughout the globe and well into, what in a Eurocentric perspective is called, the early modern age of the late fifteenth up to the late eighteenth century. It is in the 1500s that slowly but surely, those who work in government operate less and less as personal servants to a ruler, and more and more as servants of the state, except, of course, for those working in the royal or imperial household. The state and its government become impersonal entities. It is in the eighteenth century that the word 'bureaucracy' is a playful conflation of a French word, *bureau*, with that of a Greek word, *krateo*, used as a suffix. The term 'bureaucracy' is allegedly first used by Vincent, Marquis de Gournay (1712 - 1759), intendant of commerce and was mentioned in a letter by art critic and diplomat Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm (1723 – 1807) to Diderot on July 1, 1764:

The late M[onsieur] de Gournay … sometimes used to say: "We have an illness in France which bids fair havoc with us; this illness is called bureaumania. Sometimes he used to invent a fourth or fifth term of government under the heading of bureaucracy." (Albrow 1970, 16).

According to the New Testament Greek Lexicon, King James Version, the Greek word krateo means:

1. to have power, be powerful:
    a. to be chief, be master of, to rule
2. to get possession of
    a. to become master of, to obtain
    b. to take hold of
    c. to take hold of, take, seize
        1. to lay hands on one in order to get him into one's power
3. to hold
    a. to hold in the hand
    b. to hold fast, i.e. not discard or let go
        1. to keep carefully and faithfully
    c. to continue to hold, to retain
        1. of death continuing to hold one
        2. to hold in check, restrain

So the term bureaucracy connotes being in power, getting power, and holding on to power. As the state becomes dissociated from the ruler, those working for the state are increasingly viewed as bureaucrats. Especially German scholars and emigrés in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are so critical of bureaucrats that Charles Goodsell spoke of a Teutonic tradition in the study of bureaucracy (1985, 8). Stereotypical bureaucrats are lazy, pencil pushesr, out for self-interest only, and multiply like rabbits; bureaucracy is stereotyped as full of red tape, cumbersome, and officious (Raadschelders 2003, 318-319, with references to various authors).

The term bureaucrat is commonly used in a pejorative, stereotypical sense, and this is nicely captured in Franz Kafka's novels and in Erik Satie's *Sonatine Bureaucratique*. The high-ranking British civil servant, Humbert Wolfe (1885-1940), noted in the British journal Public Administration that two types of bureaucrats could be found in fictional work: the 'mandarin-parasite' and the 'slave' (1924, 41).

A scholarly and more neutral understanding of bureaucracy and bureaucrats emerges in the early nineteenth century. Georg Hegel regards bureaucrats as the new guardians of democracy who forego "…the selfish and capricious satisfaction of their subjective ends…" and serve in a "…dispassionate, upright, and polite demeanor…" (Hegel 1967, 191-193) In this quote it is easy to recognize Max Weber who writes that the key characteristic of working in bureaucracy is that its officers conduct their business *sine ira et studio*, which he translated as *ohne Haβ und Leidenschaft*, that is, without hatred or passion (Weber 1980, 129). This is a very different official from Wolfe's 'slave,' who is completely subservient, and his 'mandarin-parasite,' who is allowed to cream off some of the taxes and fees collected from the subjects for the ruler. The types of Weber and Wolfe are visible in the three types distinguished by James T.C. Liu (1919 - 1993). This Chinese-born historian and professor at the University of Pittsburgh and, later, at Princeton University, briefly summarizes listings of bureaucratic types as distinguished by, *inter alia*, Robert Merton, Alvin Gouldner, Robert Presthus, and others. He also provides a more extensive discussion of Chinese sources (from the Song dynasty, 960 – 1279 CE) on desired behavioral and functional characteristics of public officials (Liu 1959, 209, 212-213). He arrives at a three-fold distinction:

a) The *scholarly-idealistic type* is characterized by personal integrity, recognized scholarship, explicit political theories and beliefs, and willingness to endanger and even sacrifice his personal (career) interests. This is similar to the 'virtuous' type in Confucian thought. However, this type could slide into self-righteousness, excessive self-confidence, doctrinaire bias, partisanship, and love of fame;

b) The *career-minded type* is focused on his own career, and identifies with bureaucracy rather than with a specific political theory and belief. His personal integrity is shaped by the moral standard expected by social convention (cf. Kohlberg's conventional morality), by the desire to do a good job, and pride in being a professional. There are two subtypes: the 'conformist' dominates by far, and the 'executive' radiates energy, ambition, aggression and has superior administrative capability;

c) The *abusive type* has a personal and selfish interest in power, influence, and material gain. Career is merely a means to that personal end. This type is reminiscent of the 'unworthy' official in Confucianism, and his pursuit of material gains and lusts makes him the ultimate "man in the iron cage" as portrayed by Bunyan (2009 [1795], 29-30; see also Raadschelders 2019, endnote 6.) This one also has two subtypes: the 'corrupt' and the 'manipulative.' (1959, 221-223) The latter has the energy and capability of the 'executive career-minded' individual, but turns "his talent to political maneuvers, consolidating his power so that he can indulge in dishonest practices on a scale beyond the ordinary." (ibid. 223) I quote this, because the abusive and manipulative type is a common occurrence throughout history, and represents the greatest danger to democracy when quietly accepted.

As far as I am aware, after Liu two more typologies of bureaucratic personalities have seen the light of day. In a conceptual study of bureaucracy, Anthony Downs distinguishes five types. The climber is ambitious and on a fast career track. The conserver desires to maintain security and does not take risks. *Zealots* have narrow interests and usually are deficient general administrators. Advocates have substantial responsibilities and a significant overview of policies. Finally, *statesmen* are loyal to government and society as a whole (1966, 92-111).

In an empirical study of the Israeli civil service, David Nachmias and David Rosenbloom arrive four types. The *politicos* are convinced that it is important to have political connections in order to acquire bureaucratic positions and they are not very interested in the common good. *Service bureaucrats* take their cue from the public at large and seek for ways that bureaucracy can improve how it allocates tasks to individual civil servants. The *job bureaucrat* is focused on the internal demands of modern government organizations. Finally, the *statesman* is truly oriented toward society and believes in achievement, education, and talent rather than in political and personal connections (1978, 31-32).

These various stereotypes and typologies can be placed on a continuum that has the truly virtuous and selfless public official on the one end, and the unworthy, selfish public official on the other. The reality on the ground is probably somewhere in-between and to capture the complexity of civil service a conceptual framework might be useful. One example of a conceptual framework is offered in the next section, and it is based in changes and conceptions emerging in nineteenth century Europe about government and its officials.

2. A Contemporary Conceptual Framework for Characterizing Types of Civil Servants

The conceptual framework in this section might be thought of as Eurocentric given the discussion about the origins and development of government, the major changes in public institutional arrangements around the 1800s in Europe, the use of Hegel's ideal and Weber's ideal type, and the fact that this author is Dutch. However, the elements discussed below are applicable to any governing system that is fundamentally democratic in nature (unless mentioned otherwise, this section is based on Raadschelders, forthcoming).

a) *Origins and Development of Government*

Homo Sapiens has walked this earth for about 300,000 years, and for most of that time they lived in small communities of people with 30/50 up to 150 individuals. Theirs was a *physical community* of people where everybody knew everyone else, and knew who to turn to for food, for protection, for mediation, etc. Theirs was a nomadic and fairly egalitarian society with a hunter-gatherer-scavenging economy. As far as we know, there were no formalized institutional arrangements for governing. Collaboration came naturally, because most members of each community were related by kinship, and collaboration was a bare necessity for the survival of the band/group.

About 20,000 years ago, at the end of the Palaeolithic, two processes started that would change human society and economy forever: sedentarization and domestication. Both used to be identified as part of the Agricultural Revolution, around 10,000 BCE, but we now know that these processes have been much more prolonged and unfolding across millennia. At the start of the Neolithic, about 10,000 years ago, the human population has been calculated to be at around 10 to 15 million people, which amounts to roughly one individual per square mile (Corning 1983, 304). The globe was quite empty.

As people settled down and successfully domesticated certain plants/grains and animals, their numbers increased quite rapidly to about 50 million at the time that the first city-states appeared, around 5,000 BCE. Another 3,000 years later, there would be some 300 million people (Hassan 1997, 6). This had substantial effects on how people governed themselves. Based on archaeological research, it is assumed that for the first 4,000 years of sedentary life, societies were quite egalitarian. They were larger than the prehistoric bands, but, living in a tribal community and even a chiefdom, did not require extensive institutional arrangements for governing. This changed with the emergence of city-states with populations into the thousands. It is then that societies become more clearly stratified, with a ruler at the apex, a ruling aristocracy, a priesthood, soldiers, craftsmen, farmers, and slaves.

The rapid growth in population size, and the resulting society as an imagined community, required institutional arrangements that assured the protection of people from one another and from the threat of other tribes and chiefdoms. Bureaucracies emerged in these socially stratified communities because those in power were not be able to monitor the behavior of all members. In order to maintain some degree of control they needed a support structure, a bureaucracy with people to do their bidding. These pre-modern bureaucracies were extractive organizations; they exploited the natural resources (produce, labor) of their populations to benefit the ruler(s) and the ruling class. Pre-modern bureaucracies were generally not service providers in a way comparable to modern bureaucracies. They served as a "…loyal and personally ascribed cadre of supporters…" of the ruler or the ruling class, not as servants of the people (Yoffee 2005, 140).

These pre-modern bureaucracies are problem-creators rather than problem solvers (Paynter 1989), because the adaptive capability of the political-administrative system is stressed once the political leadership, through a top-heavy bureaucracy, makes impossible demands upon the productive sector (Butzer 1980). For millennia, societies had a ruler-oriented bureaucracy with bureaucrats only interested in advancing their own power, security, and comforts as long as that happens within the orbit of the ruler. Bureaucrats created selective benefits for themselves (Masters 1986, 156). As can be expected, and throughout history, civilizations declined when, among other things, their governments became too demanding. Since Antiquity, discontent with government was usually fueled by unreasonable and extraordinary taxes, leading to tax riots and – sometimes – revolution (such as the American and French Revolutions). For some 6,000 years government was the instrument in the hands of the few and (ab)used for the subjection of the many. This situation lasted into the eighteenth century.

b) *Foundation of Government and Civil Service in Democracy, 1780s – 1820s*

The major social-economic changes in human society described in the previous subsection took millennia to unfold. Another set of major social-economic changes occurred between the middle of the eighteenth up to the middle of the twentieth century. These changes are the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and unprecedented population growth. As with the changes thousands of years ago, the multiple and complex array of events that led up to these fundamental changes need not be described in this paper. However, what needs to be described are the changes in the foundational institutional arrangements for governing which happened in a pretty short period of time, namely between 1780 – 1820. Attention for this is necessary as it made possible that in the subsequent one-and-half century government came to occupy a new position and role in society. As I have described these fundamental changes in detail elsewhere, I can be brief here and use the three-level distinction introduced by Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom (1982) which I used to map out the study of public administration (Raadschelders 2003) and the development of the civil service (Raadschelders 2015).

At the constitutional level, which is that of the institutional superstructure of government, there are four major changes. First, the public sphere becomes synonymous to that of government, while the private sphere is that of anything between the household and the market. This separation of a public sector from a private sector dates back to John Locke and becomes full-blown in the work of Adam Smith (Kennedy 2010, 164-167). Second, the separation of church and state, which had been de facto in development since the twelfth century but became codified toward the end of the eighteenth century. Hence, the church, just as any other societal association other than government, becomes part of this private sector. Third, politics was separated from administration, with political officeholders being elected and members of the supporting bureaucracy being appointed on the basis of relevant educational background, merit, and professional expertise. Finally, fourth, the emergence of constitutions as the foundation of society, constraining government power *vis-à-vis* citizens and separating the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.

At the collective level, which is that of the decision making arena, this resulted in the separation of office from officeholder so that public office could no longer be inherited (except to this day for monarchs), farmed out (as in the case of tax collection throughout the ages), or sold to a third party. It is also resulted in organizing the various tasks and functions of bureaucracy in departments with a coherent set of activities. In fact, except for the top of the public sector, i.e., legislative chambers, ministerial cabinets, and high courts, government at large now became hierarchically organized on the basis of unity of command.

Last but not least, at the operational level of the day-to-day activities, those who worked in appointed career positions would receive a salary and pension in money that was adequate enough to avoid (a) the necessity of individual civil servants having secondary or even tertiary jobs and (b) possibility of corruption (e.g., accepting bribes in order to supplement base income).

These three groups of changes happened very quickly, and in the course of a lifetime. How quickly is clear when we read Georg Hegel's assessment of the new role of career civil servants and the formalization of that by Max Weber into the latter ideal-type.

c) *Hegel and Weber on the Modern Civil Servant*

Above, Hegel was mentioned as the person who considered civil servants as the new guardians of democracy. He offers an ideal image of a career civil servant, and he captures their new role vis-à-vis political officeholders as one that is actively developing and advising about policy. He trusts career civil servants and his is a sociological perspective that concerns how career civil servants can and should function in the real world. In today's democracies, career civil servants at middle and higher levels will not only help in formulating policy and advising about policy, but actually in developing policy (Page and Jenkins 2005; Page 2012). Elected officeholders rely upon the organizational memory, the professional attitude, and the substantive expertise of career officials.

Max Weber developed a more formal definition of bureaucracy as a specific organizational structure and as a personnel system. Those concerning the personnel system are listed in table 1. Befitting the principle of a clear division of labor, the first dimension is a departure from historical practice where one office could be held by multiple people (for instance, in a collegial organization) and this is still the case with political institutions today (especially legislatures; often also judiciaries). Dimensions 2 to 5 concern the nature of the relationship with elected officeholders and upon what grounds someone can be appointed in the career civil service. Dimension 4 in particular serves as a safeguard against nepotism. Dimensions 6 to 12 concern the work conditions. Civil servants are protected from the possible instabilities of the political environment as long as they provide loyal support to whichever political party (or parties in a coalition) is in power. This definition of bureaucracy befits a polyarchical and democratic system of government. It is also a definition that does not differentiate between rank or status: in a legal sense (see below) a municipal employee collecting garbage is as much a career civil servant as a director-general in a national government department.

Table 1: Bureaucracy as a Personnel System (Van Braam 1986, 216-220; Raadschelders and Rutgers 1996, 92)
1. Office held by individual functionaries,
2. who are subordinate, and
3. appointed, and
4. knowledgeable, who have expertise, and are
5. assigned by contractual agreement
6. in a tenured (secure) position, and
7. who fulfill their office as their main or only job, and
8. work in a career system
9. rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money,
10. rewarded according to rank, and
11. promoted according seniority, and
12. work under formal protection of their office.

d) *Juridical and Sociological Perspectives*

The last element of a conceptual framework for analyzing civil service and civil servants is to distinguish between juridical and sociological perspectives. From a juridical point of view, all those who are elected into public office or serving as political appointees are not part of the civil service. A civil servant is, thus, someone who is appointed, at least and at the beginning of a career, on the basis of relevant educational background and, as a career advances, on the basis of merit and professional expertise. Political officeholders, political appointees and career civil service together form the public service. Thus various categories of public servants can be distinguished: elected officeholders and political appointees on the one hand, and career civil servants on the other and they include white collar employees (those who work at a desk, write policy), uniformed officials (police, firefighters), blue collar employees (e.g., garbage collectors, water plant workers, parks and recreation workers, etc.), educational personnel, and health care providers (Raadschelders 1994).

In a sociological perspective we have to take national context and civil service roles into regard. As for national context, there is quite some variation. In the Netherlands, all those who are in non-elected and non-political appointee positions are considered career civil servants. This is similar in Scandinavian countries and in, I believe, Korea. In the United Kingdom, civil servants are those who work in Whitehall as generalists and they can rotate between departments. In France and Germany civil servants are appointed as specialists to a specific department and in both countries higher and lower level career civil servants have a specific designation (Angestellte v. Beamte, and *functionnaire* v. *employee*). In some countries, such as in Scandinavia, career civil servants are held in high regard. In others they are viewed with scorn, and then perhaps no more so then in the United States.

Societal context and appreciation has an impact upon what citizens and elected officeholders expect of civil servants, and what the latter expect from themselves respectively what the latter regards as appropriate public behavior. Western of origin is the distinction that can be made between so-called *street-level bureaucrats*, a category introduced by Michael Lipsky (1980), and *policy bureaucrats*, a term proposed by Ed Page and Bill Jenkins (2005). The former is said to be about 70% of all career civil servants and includes anyone who comes in direct contact with citizens (e.g., social workers, schoolteachers, police officers, firefighters, judges, etc.). The remaining 30% are then career policy bureaucrats who play an active role not only in fleshing out and implementing political visions and programs into policies but even in developing policies.

To understand why this is a Western conception, we can look at the work Geert Hofstede did on characterizing societal and organizational cultures (1997, 26, 53, 113). Both terms suggest some, perhaps even significant, degree of discretion for civil servants. This can be expected in countries such as the Netherlands and the USA which are characterized by a high individualism index (IDV: 80 – Netherlands resp. 91 - USA), a medium uncertainty avoidance index (UAI: 53 resp. 46), and a medium power distance index (PDI: 38 resp. 40). These are countries where subordinates can express their own opinion (IDV), where they are allowed to take risks and learn from failure (UAI), and can do so without fear for retaliation by superiors (PDI). This is much more difficult in countries with low IDV (i.e., collectivist), high UAI, and high PDI, and this is characteristic for, *inter alia,* African, Latin American, and South and Southeast Asian countries. Korea scores 18th on the IDV and is thus highly collectivist, 60th on PDI and is therefore fairly high on the perceived gap between superior and subordinate, and 85th on UAI which means that the lower a career civil servants is in the hierarchy the less s/he will take risks. Hence, there are differences in national cultures that have ramifications for what is expected from career civil servants and what they perceive as possible and allowed. There are, however, also universals in certain expectations of public servants and it is to these that we now turn.

3. Ethical Traditions on the Ideal (Public) Civil Servant

The conceptual framework in the previous section is contemporary and, when attention is limited to the modern period only, that is the past two centuries, and parts of it can be claimed as not Eurocentric since applying to the position and role of career civil servants in any democracy. However, when we go further back in time, we will see that the elements of what constitutes the ideal civil servant are, in fact, not Western in origin at all. To see this, I will consider in this section what is said about the ideal civil servant in some ethical traditions emerging in the last millennium BCE (unless mentioned otherwise, this section is derived from Jordan and Gray 2011). In the next section I will go even further back in time and present ancient Egyptian ideas dating back to the third and second millennium BCE about behavior appropriate to civil servants.

The earliest ethical traditions that described the ideal public servant are of (East) Asian origin. The best known is Confucianism, after Confucius (551 – 479 BCE), which emphasizes moral leadership and believes that this can be taught. The ruler determines what the "virtuous" civil servant is expected to do. The more virtuous the ruler, the more virtuous those who work for him. The major virtues of people, and thus of public leaders, are humanity, propriety, righteousness, reverence, loyalty, wisdom, filial piety, and forgiveness (ibid., 142; see also Rarick 2007, 25). The ideal administrator is first and foremost an expert on moral standards; there is less emphasis on technical expertise. Civil service exams serve to assure the moral quality of candidates (ibid. 141-160). Written exams are introduced in 165 BCE in Han China, and the first university for examinations was established in 124 BCE (Creel 1970, 87-88). It looks that the idea of civil service exams came from Southeast Asia to Europe (Creel 1964, 162).

By contrast, Daoism, dating back to China in the fourth century BCE, stresses a sage-king who is hardly involved in governing and relies upon the self-governing capacities of people. Daoists prize economy and efficiency above purpose and consequences of action, and they caution against bribery, the "shirking" of responsibilities, and partisanship (Jordan and Gray 2011, 86-95). Shen-Buhai, chancellor of the Han state (351-337 BCE), regards civil service examinations as important, but seems to include the Daoist preference for economy and efficiency given his preference for performance records and merit ratings as key to how a ruler can control his ministers and officials (Creel 1964, 1970). Thus, Shen-Buhai focused on administrative techniques. A few decades after Shen-Buhai passed away, it was the Chinese philosopher Hsün-zu (313-238 BCE) who pointed out that any civil servant should have both virtue and technical expertise (Creel 1974, 129). In the same period, Shen-Buhai was criticized by political philosopher Han-fei (280 - 233 BCE) for not paying sufficient attention to the role and rule of law (Creel 1970, 122). This element is most strongly pursued by the Legalists of the Fa-chia (School of Law) and they are seen as situated between Confucianism and Daoism for advocating adherence to strict and stable codes of rites, regulation, and law (Jordan and Gray, 103).

From the above, it is clear that ancient Chinese thought about the ideal civil servant is initially focused on *morality,* and is in subsequent centuries was augmented by attention for *administrative techniques* and for *rules and law*.

Buddhism, dating back to the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, appears to have much in common with Confucianism. In the *Teaching of Buddha* we read: "If an important minister of state neglects his duties, works for his own profit, or accepts bribes, it will cause a rapid decay of public morals […] (in that case) faithful ministers will retire from public service, wise men will keep silent from fear of complications […] Under such conditions the power of government becomes ineffective and its righteous policies fall into ruins. Such unjust officials are the thieves of people's happiness, yet are worse than thieves because they defraud both ruler and people and are the cause of the nation's troubles." (Jordan and Gray, 110) Wrapped in this comment are two important elements. First, the emphasis on the civil servant as an example of moral behavior, and this is also found in Confucianism. Second, and closely related to the first, the attention for assuring that civil servants are not working to benefit themselves.

In the Western world, attention for the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of a public servant are visible in the works by Plato and Aristotle. In *The Republic* Plato observes, i.a., that the city "will be good in the fullest sense of the word […when] it "is wise, courageous, temperate, and just." (Plato 1985, 123; verse 427e) In the *Nicomachean* Ethics Aristotle writes quite extensively about intellectual virtues (ch. VI) and these include prudence or practical wisdom, wisdom as a combination of intuition and scientific knowledge, understanding, and judgment. He writes that "Pericles and others like him are prudent, because they can envisage what is good for themselves and for people in general; we consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management of households or states. This is why we call temperance by this name, on the ground that it preserves wisdom." (Aristotle 1976, 209-210). The wisdom of Confucius, Buddha, Plato and Aristotle is also visible in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (1992): morality and wisdom emerge from introspection and reflection about one's relation to others[1].

Christianity in its various manifestations recognizes that civil servants must have spiritual and technical expertise, but mainly focuses on the spiritual (Jordan and Gray, 205). In the American constitutionalist and Republican tradition, statesmanship is a function of both specific skills, such as those pursued under scientific management, and of democratic values. Populism should be anathema to democracy. Also, scientific management and its contemporary of New Public Management (NPM) should not stand alone in a democracy as it has little attention for the moral side of decision making (ibid., 176-177, 205). Both scientific management and NPM are expressions of, as Jon Pierre calls it, the *public interest model* that emphasizes pragmatic and flexible decision making and is more performance-driven and market oriented. This is mainly found in Anglo-American countries. Continental European countries are dominated by a *Rechtsstaat model* where legislative authority is the primary mechanism upon which government works (Pierre 1995). Max Weber's

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[1] It would be useful to include the Indian scholar Kautilya and his *Artha'sastra* in this listing, but I have not consulted his work yet.

ideal type fits this *Rechtsstaat* model with its emphasis on bureaucracy as specific organizational type and structure on the one hand, and as specific personnel system and type of civil servant on the other. Clearly there is not one Western 'model' or ideal. If anything, there is at least a Western and a Weberian representation of ideal civil servants, as Tao (2018) points out (see below). Frankly, one can wonder whether there is a Western model or tradition at all. What has Western scholarship added to ancient ideas about ideal civil servants? The answer to that question starts here and will be summarized in the conclusion.

Korean public administration scholars recognize the importance of Confucian influence in Korean government, but at the same time suggest that it might benefit from some synthesis with foreign ideas (Kim 2012, 228), and that a Good Governance model - which balances efficiency with legitimacy and accountability - might suit Korea better than the naked application of NPM-principles (Jung 2014, 12). Also, there is actually significant overlap between Eastern and Western understandings of civil service (Im et al. 2013, 287). Indeed, the Confucian emphasis upon the importance of internalizing moral values in an individual is reminiscent of Carl Friedrich's reliance upon an internal moral compass and of John Rohr's "high road" of ethics (1986; see also Im et al. 2013, 292). Max Weber's approach is one that seeks guidance for behavior in an impartial legal framework. Professor of business administration, Charles Rarick, suggests that Max Weber's Protestant ethic does not differ much from the Chinese and Southeast Asian belief in hard work, loyalty to organization, thrift, dedication, love for learning and wisdom, and concern for social propriety (Rarick 2007, 26).

The American public administration scholar Jill Tao, chair of the Department of Public Administration at Incheon National University, also points to the similarities between Confucius and Weber (2018). Her article is particularly interesting because she augments George Frederickson's contrasting of Western and Confucian thought (2002, 623) with a third category, namely Weberian thought. Indeed, as Pierre's contrast of a *public service* and a *Rechtsstaat* model suggests, one cannot subsume Weberian thought under the category of Western thought. That is, superficially there are significant differences in perceptions of ideal civil servants between various Western countries. Digging deeper, however, it becomes clear that no matter the visible differences between countries, the foundation in morality, administrative technique, and rule of law, is one that is not Western of origin. Meanwhile, and on a side note, Frederickson's reading of Confucianism is intriguing as he firmly believes that the Confucian concept of social order based on moral convention and education would appeal to the West, and I quote, "with its adult children, infantile adults, incestuous fathers, criminal children, and androgynous individuals." (Frederickson 2002, 620-621) I cannot help wondering whether Frederickson really intends to indict the Western world at large or has a specific country in mind.

4. The Very Ancient Roots of Ethical Traditions concerning the Ideal Public Servant

George Washington insisted upon 'fitness of character' (Mosher 1968, 57) for those working in the public service. In the Irish rundale system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where commoners elected their King and elders, the good king was supposed to have "Stature, strength, comeliness [...] justice, wisdom and knowledge" next to various other desired attributes such as economic well-being (Slater and Flaherty 2009, 14-15). Clearly, what constitutes a good public servant is grounded in an internal moral compass developed through education and/or experience. The visions and wisdom of Confucius, Buddha, Plato, Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius (1992), Washington and many others has roots in the ancient instruction or wisdom literature, a tradition that continued in Europe with the so-called *Fürstenspiegel* (Rutgers 2004, 52). These instructions have drawn attention because they are copied, and sometimes amended, in the Book of Proverbs of the Hebrew Bible. In this section some of these wisdoms will be highlighted quoting parts that are relevant to the topic of this paper (in the following the page references are all to Pritchard 1969).

Among the oldest of instructions is *The Instruction of Prince Hor-Dedef* (27th c/ BCE) and is ascribed to Ii-em-hotep, a high official of pharaoh Djoser and of Hor-Dedef, son of pharaoh Khufo (or Cheops): "[Be not] boastful before (my very) eyes, and beware of the boasting of another." (419) In this quote humility is presented as an important characteristic of a public servant, and it suggests a focus on something larger than oneself.

Possibly the best known of these wisdoms is *The Instruction of the Vizier Ptah-Hotep*, city administrator and vizier of Pharaoh Djedkare Isesi, ruling from the late 25th to the mid-24th century BCE at the end of the fifth dynasty. He advises humility and righteousness: "Let not thy heart be puffed-up because of thy knowledge." […] "If thou art a leader commanding the affairs of the multitude, seek out for thyself every beneficial deed, until it may be that thy (own) affairs are without wrong. Justice is great, and its appropriateness is lasting." (412) As the only surviving copies of this instruction date back to the first intermediate period and the middle kingdom (around 1800 BCE) it could be that its content may be based in earlier writing but not compiled until later (Quirke 2004, 90; nota bene, I have not been able to read this source).

Written during the breakdown of central government at the end of the Old Kingdom (sixth dynasty, 2300-2150 BCE), *The Admonitions of Ipu-Wer* condemns weak rulers, and points to the importance of *ma'at*, which is justice/truth, and to be equitable when passing justice: "Authority, Perception, and Justice are with thee, (but) it is confusion which thou wouldst set throughout the land." (443)

Well-known are *The Protests of the Eloquent Peasant* (Middle Kingdom, 21st c. BCE) where one can find the following remark: "To the doer to cause that he do" (409) which is a version of the Golden Rule. On the same page the eloquent peasant observes what he expects from a public official, namely, "Thou were appointed to be a dam for the sufferer, guarding lest he drown" and "The covetous man is void of success." The theme of covetousness must be very important because it is reiterated in "Do not be covetous at a division. Do not be greedy, unless (it be) for thy (own) portion. Do not be covetous against thy (own) kindred. Greater is the respect for the mild than (for) the strong." (413; see also Van Blerk 2006) Covetousness has found its way into the Mosaic tenth commandment, and the respect for the mild suggests that civil servants are expected to treat everyone on a similar basis, i.e., impartial.

Also dating back to the Middle Kingdom is *The Instruction for King Meri-Ka-Re* (21st - 20th BCE) which echoes the same themes: "Be not evil: patience is good […] Respect the nobles and make thy people prosper. […] He who is covetous when other men possess is a fool, (because [life] upon earth passes by […] He who is rich does not show partiality to his (own) house […] Do justice whilst thou endures upon earth; do not oppress the widow; supplant no man in the property of his father; and impair no officials at their posts. Be on thy guard against punishing wrongfully […] Do not distinguish the son of a man (JR: of birth and position), (but) take to thyself a man because of the work of his hands." (415)

Almost a millennium later it is in *The Instruction of Ani, a scribe* (21st-22nd dynasty, 11th-8th BCE) that the following advice can be found: "Thou shouldst not eat bread when another is waiting and thou dost not stretch forth thy hand to the food for him […] Be not greedy to fill thy belly." (421) In John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath (1939) we find that one of the rules in the tent camps in California, established by those who had fled the Dust Bowl of Arkansas and Oklahoma in the 1930s, was that one shared food with the neighbor who had nothing.

Dating to roughly the same period is *The Instruction of Amen-Em-Opet* (1300 – 1075 BCE) where several elements of earlier wisdoms seem to come together:

Cast not thy heart in pursuit of riches,

(For) there is no ignoring Fate and Fortune.

Place not thy heart upon externals,

(For) every man belongs to his (appointed) hour

[…]

Do not bear witness with false words

[…]

Do not confuse a man in the law court,

Nor divert the righteous man.

Give not thy attention (only) to him clothed in white,

Nor give consideration to him that is unkempt.

Do not accept the bribe of a powerful man,

Nor oppress for him the disabled.

Justice is the great reward of god. (422-423)

Especially in the remark that one should not place too much "heart upon externals" it is easy to see similarities to Marcus Aurelius' warning against indulging in sensory affections and in John Bunyan's "man in an iron cage" who ended in that cage because he had pursued the lusts, pleasures and material possessions of the world (1795). The iron cage metaphor returns in Talcott Parsons' translation of Weber's *stahlhartes Gehäuse*.

Advice similar to that found in Egyptian texts can also be found in Mesopotamian clay tablets. One example is from the Late Assyrian period (9th to 6th century BCE) titled Advice to a Prince. The text is all about maintaining just and proper relations with nobles, citizens, foreigners and have respect for their property: "If a king does not heed justice, his people will be thrown into chaos […] If he does not heed the justice of his land, Ea, king of destinies will alter his destiny […] if he does not heed his nobles, his life will be cut short." (Lambert 1960, 113)

The ancient Near Eastern texts emphasize above all moral values as key to being a public servant. To have administrative and technical skills does not seem to be considered, even though we know that writing was an important skill and taught in the ancient world to those expected to prepare for a career in government. A similar focus on moral values is found in Confucianism. As far as I know, it is not until Shen-Buhai that practical skills are mentioned as important to administrators. Many of the ancient Near Eastern, Chinese and Greek ideas and counsels can be found in *Pan'gye surok*, written by the Korean scholar Yu Hyŏngwŏn (1622-1672) during the Chosŏn Kingdom (1392-1910).

5. Yu Hyŏngwŏn: A Korean Scholar on Bureaucracy and the Ideal Civil Servant

Yu Hyŏngwŏn's study about desirable reforms of Korean government did not attract attention until much later (Palais, 1996, 8; unless mentioned otherwise, all references in this section are to Palais), but is intriguing because of his effort to connect Confucian values to the running of bureaucracy and the daily affairs of state. As in the European early modern *Kameralistik* and *sciences de la police* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Rutgers 2004), he also pays much attention to various national government tasks such as those concerning land administration, taxation, water management, currency administration, education, local government institutions and policies for, among other things, granaries and workfare relief, military supplies and tactics, walls and moats, post stations, care for the elderly and slavery. I will on focus on three themes in his work that are relevant to the topic of this paper: the foundational institutional arrangements, the bureaucracy, and the individual civil servant. The reader will be able to see how the various elements are similar to those in ancient Middle Eastern texts, are drawn from ancient Chinese texts, and foreshadow several of Weber's ideal typical elements of bureaucracy.

a) *The foundational institutional arrangements*

Given the potential for despotism and tyranny, Yu Hyŏngwŏn is deeply concerned with how to block it and advises three, interrelated measures: control of royal expenditure, using the king in a symbolic way through the inculcation of Confucian values, and distribution of authority in running the bureaucracy and the daily affairs of state (581). The basic means of achieving this is to assure that the king is as answerable to bureaucratic regulation as are his officials, with the latter basically controlling expenditure and management of the state (611). Distribution of authority is assured by the creation of a State Council, composed of five senior and three lower ranking officials and headed by a single councilor (594). This State Council is a collegial organization, the members if which each head a bureaucratic department, and this is similar to what is found in many countries in the world today.

b) *The bureaucracy*

Central to his vision for bureaucracy is the principle of economy, operationalized both in terms of organizational structure as well as in terms of personnel size. Yu Hyŏngwŏn seeks a rational division of labor so that overlap or duplication of various functions can be avoided. At the same time, achieving the various tasks of government should be done by the lowest possible number of officials (612). In this, elements of Taylor's principles of scientific management can be recognized. Yu Hyŏngwŏn also advised to deal with sinecures, i.e., jobs that pay but require minimal work, and superfluous offices (614), and this is reminiscent of the reforms pursued under the English King George III (Cohen 1941, 20).

c) *The individual civil servant*

Throughout his book, Yu Hyŏngwŏn discusses and draws from Chinese wisdoms developed during the Hsia (or: Xia; 2070 – 1600s BCE), Shang (1700 – 1027 BCE), and Chou (1027 – 221 BCE) periods, and his aim was to translate their practices and principles to Korean government (10). Several of his proposals are standard practice in the hiring and promotion of civil servants today, including state financing of government rather than relying upon fees and bribing by unsalaried officials, establishing regular work assignments at specific hours (and not allowing working from home, or conducting private business at work), and paying all clerks a regular salary (627). This last was among his biggest challenges and never adopted (641, 1013). He also advised to recruit the most talented people in public service, and in his view talent was that which combined worth (as assessed in terms of moral knowledge) and ability (669). That the latter must refer to administrative and technical skills seems clear in light of his advice to select and promote people on the basis of observation and recommendation (672). Yu Hyŏngwŏn is considered one of the early representatives of a Korean reform effort that sought to counter ritualistic and formalistic Confucianism through attention for practical learning (*Sil-hak*) (Kim 2012, 219).

He also reviews Chou personnel policies that prescribed performance evaluations conducted every three years, with a grand review every nine years. These reviews focused on six elements of performance: goodness or doing affairs well, ability to carry out, seriousness of not abandoning your post, law or maintaining these without error, discrimination or not being confused in making decisions, and rectitude or acting without partiality. Especially the latter about "acting without partiality" reminds of the ancient Egyptian advice of doing justice to all, and of the Weberian *sine ira et studio*.

By way of conclusion, his reform proposals are very comprehensive and inspired by balancing the need for rational planning with respect for tradition (642). He wanted to establish a truly moral society ruled by moral officials who respected popular and peasant welfare. His sympathy for common people was balanced by recognizing the need for hierarchy (1012). Yu Hyŏngwŏn's attention for both national and local government is of interest to contemporary Korea. Following the centralized-unitary system of the Chosŏn kingdom, the highly centralized administration during the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), and the autocratic and military rule until 1987, Korea has become a true democracy with attention for relations between state, business, industry, and labor (Jung 2014, 29) (cf. 'corporatism' in Western Europe), and with more decentralized policies than is the case in, for instance, Southern Europe (Jung 2014, 159, 163).

6. Why do Images of the Ideal Civil Servant Emerge in Human Communities?

People have a need for government once living in imagined communities, where people only know few others. They need government to mediate in conflict, to protect against outside threat, and to take care of functions that cannot be addressed on the basis of collaborative self-governance. In imagined communities it becomes really important to "feel" that those working in and for government can be trusted. The question is: on what basis can they be trusted as they are not personally known? Furthermore, can we trust that public officials will treat everyone with equal attention? Can we trust that public officials will not use their office for personal gain? The ancient Egyptian texts suggest that the most important elements and characteristics of those working in public office are a high sense of moral integrity and impartiality that is born from introspection about self and one's relation to others. There is no indication that specific administrative skills and/or techniques are considered important and that is, probably, because government is small in terms of functions, and, consequentially, in terms of personnel size, organizational structure, number of rules and regulations, and revenue and expenditure.

That the focus of the earliest instruction or wisdom texts is on moral integrity and impartiality is not surprising as it deals with features of human behavior and psychology. It was St. Augustine who observed that all human societies are subject to various conflicting elements of sociality: collectivism – individualism; egalitarianism – hierarchy; submission and domination; cooperation – aggression (conflict); conformity – uniqueness; community – competition; altruism (honorability) - selfishness (manipulation: deceit, under cover, covert, cheating); compassion – cruelty, and impulsive (emotional) – rational (deliberative) behavior (Manent 2013, 279-280; see also Ariely 2012, 98). In the small physical communities of the hunter-gatherer bands it is virtually impossible for deviant behavior, that is behavior which can be harmful to the group, to go unnoticed. The chance to hide selfish and deviant behaviors is far greater in the imagined communities of the urban jungles of the world. People must have known this once they started living in cities, hence the quick recognition of the importance of morality and impartiality.

From a common ancestor, the great apes and humans inherited a rank-order social system that operated upon a hierarchy, i.e., stratification, of positions of influence. The human hunter-gatherers switched to a society that operated upon reverse dominance hierarchy (i.e., keeping in check the extent to which a dominant member can usurp power indefinitely), conformity, kinship, egalitarianism, and reciprocity, and this was possible because they lived in a physical community of people. Humans in past and present engage in small-scale cooperation that can be characterized by nepotism, cronyism, deference to authority, dominance hierarchy and prestige, inter-group competition, and alliances on the one hand, and reverse dominance hierarchy, polite consensus, sharing, conformity, kinship, and face-to-face reciprocity on the other. These behaviors are all visible in physical and in imagined communities of people. Only in the latter, though, do we find large-scale cooperation characterized by coercive leadership on the basis of experience and merit, reverse orthodox dominance hierarchy, non-egalitarian social interactions, conformity, citizenship, hierarchical and prestige dominance, alliances, as well as reciprocity.

We will continue needing attention for morality and ethics in and for public office and must continue striving for the kind of education that at minimum provides knowledge about what behavior should be desired of an ideal public/civil servant. We need that as much today as people needed that 5.000 years ago and there are several reasons for that.

First, because we cannot assume that social and economic inequalities are kept in check to some degree on the basis of self-monitoring and self-restraint only, since some people will be selfish. Second, because people are endowed with different levels of abilities and in imagined communities those who cannot protect themselves (children, the physically and mentally handicapped, the elderly) and have no relatives or friends to look after them must be protected by government and its officials. Third, we need impartial public servants to mediate in conflicts between citizens, between private corporations and citizens, between citizens and government, and between private corporations and government.

Fourth, from the extensive research in behavioral psychology in the past forty years we have learned how people act upon many biases and public servants cognizant of these can actually assure the impartial application of rules and regulations. In relation to this, fifth, people have a tendency to confuse morality with conformity (to rules, social expectations), rank, cleanliness and even beauty (Pinker 2002, 294). We know that morality cannot be legislated, but we can expect from public servants that they, at least, know that morality and impartiality are grounded in the triad of principled ~, deontological ~, and consequentialist ethics (Svara 1997). That is, decisions made and actions taken by public officials for the benefit of citizens can only be legitimized by the combined forces of morality (i.e., principled ethics) and the rule of law (i.e., deontological ethics), and when in consideration of desired outcomes (i.e. consequentialist ethics).

7. Balancing Conflicting Inclinations on the Ground: Morality Internal, Rules External

The main question of this paper as to whether there are Eastern and Western traditions in identifying the ideal civil servant can be answered. From literature we know that bureaucracy and bureaucrats/civil servants are stereotyped in similar ways across the globe. With regard to civil servants, I have not addressed in detail the variation in appreciation and respect for civil servants across countries. In some countries they are well respected and appreciated (Scandinavian countries), in many countries they are somewhat respected and appreciated, while in some other countries they are actually distrusted (United States) or despised and eyed with fear (mostly in authoritarian regimes). But, national differences do not constitute types nor a specific ideal. I have also not addressed civil servants' functional qualities as these are generally not central or relevant in any contemplation, 5,000 years ago or now, of what constitutes an ideal civil servant. All civil servants are expected to have the skills and experience to fulfill their responsibilities adequately if not better than adequate.

What is important in discussions about so-called civil service traditions are the behavioral and attitudinal expectations that are value-laden. It seems that in the Near Eastern literature of Antiquity, in Eastern (Confucianism, Buddhism) traditions, and in Ancient Greece the emphasis is mostly on the moral quality of public servants, while the contemporary Western focus is to larger or smaller extent more on the outcomes of actions in terms of factual and measured, i.e., calculated, achievement. The latter has become very important in Western countries since the late nineteenth century, no better illustrated than with the uncritical embrace of performance-management and ~~-measurement in scientific management and New Public Management.

What, however, has travelled throughout the ages is the insistence upon morality and impartiality and it is therefore that I argue that so-called Eastern and Western approaches to the ideal civil servant evaporate as soon as we look at what is considered the deep basis upon which public/civil servants are supposed to think and act. In fact, living in an age where material and immaterial things are calculated in money and/or in rankings, it becomes very important to rekindle attention for the ethics of public office.

Looking back it seems that experienced, usually anonymous, administrators in Ancient Egypt focused on the moral elements of public office. This was augmented with attention for administrative techniques in the first millennium BCE by high-ranking public officials such as Shen-Bui, and pretty quickly expanded to include attention for rules and law. That combination of the moral and practical elements relevant to any civil servant is clearly visible in the reform movement starting in seventeenth century Korea with Yu Hyŏngwŏn as one of its early representatives. That said, I can only conclude that a conception of the ideal civil servant developed in the Ancient Near East and was augmented in the Far East and in Greece. If not done before, a nice research project would be to compare the writings of ancient political philosophers and thinkers such as Shen-Bui, Kautilya, Shang-Yang, and others to the content of the medieval *Fürstenspiegel* in Europe for the latter include a mixture of moral and practical elements.

As the position and role of governments grow over time, so do expectations of civil servants increase. In the Western world the emphasis in the past 150 years or so seems to be one where the ideal civil servant is envisaged as embedded in the context of the rule of law, with less attention for the ethical and moral side of the work they do. In Western handbooks, attention for public sector ethics has been increasing since the 1970s, but is perhaps focused too much at turning questions of morality and integrity into something poured in a decision tree (Van Blijswijk et al. 2004, 723). That can be expected in a time and context where performance management and measurement drown out attention for questioning the moral side of decision and policy making.

What can be learned from the Near and Far Eastern literatures written so long ago, and from political philosophers such as Yu Hyŏngwŏn in Korea and his contemporaries in Europe (e.g., Veit Ludvig von Seckendorf, De la Mare) more recently, is that the ideal civil servant is one who operates upon an internal moral compass, recognizes the need for practical skills, and accepts external oversight through rules and law. Max Weber is important as codifier of ideas that date back farther than has been acknowledged in the public administration literature. There is, however, something that the Western world has contributed to the ideal civil servant as far as s/he works in a democratic political system, and that is that s/he must be not only moral, have the necessary skills, and understand the law as the framework within which all (the heads of state and government included) operate, but also that s/he must be pro-active in developing policy. The range of government tasks, functions and services in democracies is far larger than ever before. In fact, there is no historical precedent for the position and role of government in contemporary democracies. Democracy is not so much threatened by bureaucracy as Max Weber and his contemporaries (e.g., Kafka, Satie) feared, but safeguarded by bureaucracy as Georg Hegel glimpsed. Political officeholders cannot possible have the detailed substantive knowledge that the highly educated career civil servant brings to the table. What is needed in democracies is not the obedient civil servant of old, but a pro-active policy bureaucrat and that may well require cultural change rather than civil service reform only.

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Figure 1: *Roles and Expectations of Civil Servants* (based on Eurocentric periodization)

	Basic skills	Advanced skills	Leadership vision
Personal servant since Antiquity	Writing letters and other official documents (e.g., trade records, wage records)	Accounting; performance management	Just, moral, integrity, righteous, not pursuing self-interest, impartiality; ancient Near Eastern and Chinese texts
State servant since early modern age	Ibidem + some writing law	Ibidem + double-entry bookkeeping and in some cases a law degree (in ancient China, since Han dynasty); attention for specific policy areas (in Europe: *kameralistik, science de la police*; in Asia, Yu Hyŏngwŏn)	Trustees, stewards of the people (cf. Althusius, Yu Hyŏngwŏn)
constitutional level changes 1780 - 1820	Separation of politics and administration; separation of church and state; separation of public from private; and constitutionalism		
collective level changes 1780 - 1820	Departmentalization and separation of office and officeholder		
operational level changes 1780 - 1820	Adequate salary and pension in money		
Civil servant since early 19th c.	Ibidem, + some writing policy	Ibidem + some with education other than law (e.g., medicine for health policy; agriculture, engineering etc.)	Hegel's "new guardians of democracy"; Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy as organization and as personnel system
a) Protected servant since late 19th c.	Ibidem + increase of knowledge workers (i.e. careerists with specific education relevant to a policy area)	Ibidem + increased emphasis upon importance of knowledge work; Civil Service Acts (e.g., USA 1883; Netherlands 1929; France 1949) provide capstone in the development to a professional service	Ibidem + policy makers, and becoming managers of big organizations with substantial personnel and budgetary responsibilities
b) Professional servant since early 20th c.	Ibidem, and at most national levels the civil service is almost entirely white collar, i.e. bureaucratized in Weberian terms	After WWII: next to initial degree, since 1950s rapid increase in MPA programs taken as second degree for those who aspire to rise in the ranks (cf. Mosher 1968)	ibidem + since 1930s important role in writing secondary legislation, highly increased need for policy advising and managerial skills

Politics, Diplomacy and Security
The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States

The Federal System of Switzerland:
A Promoter of Innovation and Inclusiveness

Presentation

Reiner EICHENBERGER

Professor
Department of Economics
University of Fribourg

Switzerland

Reiner EICHENBERGER (*1961) is Professor for Economic and Financial Policy at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland (since 1998). He studied Economics at the University of Zurich where he also gained his PhD and Habilitation. He authored or co-authored three books and more than 140 academic articles.

He specializes in political and institutional economics as well as institutional innovations such as the deregulation of the political process. He is an expert in Swiss institutions, i.e. federalism, direct democracy, directly elected auditing commissions, and the direct election of the members of government. He sees good economists not as preachers of market efficiency but as specialists for the identification and effective treatment of market failures in economic and political markets. Therefore, he often publishes in non-academic outlets and is engaged in various ways in public decision-making, e.g., as a Member of the Swiss Federal Communication Commission, the independent regulator of the Swiss telecom sector (2006-2017).

He is a long-time editor of Kyklos, an economics and social sciences general interest journal, and he is Vice President of the Senate of the University of Fribourg. In the ranking of NZZ/FAZ/Presse of Swiss economists and their societal influence he was ranked second during the last three years. In 2016 he was awarded the STAB prize (Stiftung für Abendländische Ethik und Kultur).

The federal system of Switzerland

A promoter of innovation and inclusiveness

Prof. Dr. Reiner Eichenberger

University of Fribourg
&
CREMA – Center of Research in Economics, Management and the Arts

DMZ International Forum on Peace and Economy, August 29, 2019

2

- Outlook

  - The Swiss system: a traditional overview

  - Explaining success: the role of institutions

    - Swiss secret recipes

    - Conclusions

3

The Swiss system: a traditional overview

- population 8.6 millions, area 41'300 km^2, four languages

- federalism: strong municipalities in strong cantons in a strong federation

- highly decentralized: tax autonomy of 26 cantons, 2200 municipalities

  - cantons: tax schedules for income, wealth and business taxes

  - municipalities: multiplier on cantonal taxes

  - federation: highly progressive income tax, business tax, VAT

  - fiscal equalization between and within cantons

  ⇒ large differences in taxation, up to 200-250 percent

4

... The Swiss system: a traditional overview

- fiscal structure (percentages, 2016)

	federal	cantonal	municipal
expenditures	34.1	43.2	22.8
total tax income	46.4	33.0	20.6
income and wealth taxes, households and firms	24.3	45.6	30.1

- probably the most decentralized country worldwide

    - but USA, Canada, Germany?

        - Switzerland: smaller than US, Canadian and German states

- direct democracy

    - referenda and initiative at all levels

        - signature requirement federal level: 1 - 2 percent

    - 80 percent of municipalities with town meeting

⇒ centralist: "must be chaos"

Swiss GDP per capita, current exchange rate: **90 percent higher than in Germany!**

	Switzerland	Austria	Germany	Denmark	France	USA
GDP/capita, 2018 $, PPP 2018	67'961	55'529	53'749	55'138	45'149	62'480
Debt/GDP, 2016	29,8	80,4	65,1	36,9	98,4	107
Government/GDP, 2014	32,9	52,7	44,3	56,0	57,5	37,3
Immigrants, foreign born, 2016	29,1	18,1	13,9	9,6	12,4	13,5
Competitiveness (WEF and IMD)	Switzerland usually ahead of D, A, DK, F					

⇒ extreme decentralization and direct democracy: no road to chaos!

- other measures of success

    - unemployment, infrastructure, education (e.g. Pisa), innovativeness (e.g. patents), life expectancy, happiness, immigration, property prices, ...

⇒ the Swiss system works well

Explaining success: The role of institutions

- economic markets often fail (externalities, natural monopolies, asymmetric information)

- BUT: government also fails

    - monopoly power of government

    - lack of klowledge of

        ... politicians and citizens about problems and solutions

        ... politicians about preferences of citizens

        ... citizens about positions and activities of politicians

        ... large asymmetries between groups

    ⇒ government serves well-organized interest groups

⇒ urgently needed: competition as a monitoring and information device

- The 4 dimensions of domestic political competition ...

  - between jurisdictions: Federalism and decentralization

  - between politicians for power: Representative democracy

  - between different proposals: Direct democracy

  - between governmental bodies

- The 4 dimensions of domestic political competition ...

  - between jurisdictions: Federalism and decentralization
    - CHE: extreme decentralization
  - between politicians for power: Representative democracy
    - CHE: direct election of almost all members of government
  - between different proposals: Direct democracy
    - CHE: extreme direct democracy
  - between governmental bodies
    - CHE: directly elected criticism commissions

  ⇒ Switzerland has an extremely competitive political process

- Decentralization:

  - competition: exit, voting by feet
    - constraint for government
    - information turns into a private good

  - variety: comparison, yardstick competition
    - decreases information costs

  - changes the policy game
    - fiscal equivalence: less externalities between local units
    - new alternative: expenditures or tax reductions?

- Direct democracy

    - opens up the market for politics: new groups, not only parties
    - open discourse provides information on
      - problems and solutions
      - citizens' preferences
      - positions of politicians

 ⇒ decentralization and direct democracy support representative democracy

Swiss secret recipes: Swiss electoral institutions

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- Combination of proportional and majoritarian elections

- Mass of politicians: proportional elections
    - National Council (lower house, 200 members)
    - Cantonal and municipal parliaments
        ⇒ large number of parties, broad representation

- More influential politicians: multi-seat majoritarian elections
    - Council of States (upper house, 46 members), usually 2 seats
    - members of cantonal and municipal governments, 5-9 seats
    - number of votes per citizen = number of seats
        ⇒ effective convergence
        ⇒ multi party concordance governance: consociationalism
        ⇒ "unity in variety" and "stability and continuous change"


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- Multi-seat majoritarian elections

$c_1 \rightarrow m \leftarrow c_2$

left   Single-seat majority with two candidates ⇨ convergence   right

$c_1 \rightarrow m \quad c_2 \, c_3 \, c_4 \, c_5$

left   Single-seat majority with three candidates ⇨ divergence   right

$c_1 \rightarrow m \leftarrow c_2 \, c_3$

left   Two-seat majority with three candidates ⇨ convergence   right

$c_4 \, c_1 \rightarrow m \quad c_2 \, c_3 \, c_5$

left   Two-seat majority with five candidates ⇨ divergence   right

---

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Multi-seat majoritarian elections ...

c c c c c →m← c c c c c

left   right

Five-seat majority with ten candidates ⇨ convergence

- General rule (Cox, AJPS 1990): Convergence if
    - candidates ≤ 2 * seats (no partial abstention)
    - candidates ≤ seats + 1 (full partial abstention)
    - but: - incentives for partial abstention are fragile
              - not much partial abstention in SUI (Schafer 2019)

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...Secrets of Switzerland, Why consociational governments?

- Number of candidates? endogenous reduction!

    - voters: preferences for parties and individual politicians

        → party preference votes are dispersed over party candidates

        → optimal party strategy: list less than N candidates

        → race of parties to reduce number of candidates

        → expected number of candidates ≤ 2 * N

    ⇒ "endogenous consociationalism" (Eichenberger/Schafer/Stadelmann 2019)

    ⇒ in many cantons: rotation of presidency

- **Federal level**

  - government = 7 Federal Councils

    - elected individually by parliament, majority rule, 4 years
    - yearly rotation of presidency
    - traditional perspective: "voluntary" power sharing formula
    - rather: "equilibrium consociationalism"
    - → strong convergence to the median position

  - parliament: two equivalent chambers

    - Council of State: multi-seat majority
    - → strong convergence to the median position

  - referenda

    - → strong convergence to the median position

Conclusions

- Switzerland illustrates that decentralization and direct democracy

  - do not lead into chaos, but
  - highly fruitful if some rules are observed:
    decentralization of spending and taxes, sound fiscal equalization

- Swiss experience goes beyond decentralization and direct democracy

  - consociational democracy is endogenous to electoral institutions
  - majority elected audit commissions

- Can other countries import "Swiss" institutions?

  - YES, not specific to Swiss characteristics
  - culture endogenous to institutions
  - small scale states work perfectly
    Ministates: Liechtenstein, Monaco, …
    City States: Singapore, Luxemburg, …
  - fiscal autonomy of South Tyrol vs Italy vs Sicily
  - direct democracy in US states, Bavaria, Hamburg, Taiwan, etc.

?

Appendix: secret recipes: elected auditing commissions

- How can town meetings be successful?

  - citizens elect 5 to 9 members of government by majority vote

  - but how can citizens control the government?

- citizens elect a second, competing body:

  - auditing commission: information, criticism and control
    - *Rechnungsprüfungskommission RPK,*
      Finanzkommission, Geschäftsprüfungskommission

  - related to court of accounts, auditors

  - but: ex-ante criticism and control

  - majority/plurality election of individual members

  - auditing commission AC: similar to parliament, opposition party?

  - NO, totally different incentives!

    - Opposition party: wants to be elected into government
      - → incentives: block government politics

    - AC: no decision power, only information and criticism
      - want to be reelected as AC member
      - → incentives: constructive criticism of government

    - ⇒ large beneficial effects on municipal taxes and expenditures

        Schelker / Eichenberger JCompEc 2010
        cross section for Swiss municipalities 1999
        panel for Swiss cantons 1990-2000

Appendix II: Assertions about sources of success

- technology, capital?
  - NO: technology and capital is internationally mobile

- no WW I, no WW II?
  - this was 70 / 100 years ago
  - other European countries also no WWs (Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Ireland)
  - richest country already 1910

- stolen from others? tax haven? black money?

- stolen from others? tax haven? black money?
  - this ended 5 to 10 years ago
  - realistically: 1000 billion CHF black money

        gross margin of banks: 1 percent
        net margin of banks: 0.3 percent
        additional net earning: 3 billions
                            = 0.5 % of GDP

  - → black money: no relevant effect

⇒ *The main explanation for Swiss success is: good institutions!*

Status of Inclusive States in Theory of the State and Implementation Strategies

Presentation

EUN Jaeho

Vice President
Korea Institute of Public Administration

Republic of Korea

Dr. EUN Jaeho is a senior research fellow at Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) and an adjunct professor of Graduate School of Future studies in Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Having served as a visiting professor at the University of Paris 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne) and ENA-Tunis(Tunisia), Dr. EUN Jaeho is interested in building up a durable international research network for comparative study of policy and public administration. His scholarly activities focus on civil service reform, policy analysis, conflict prevention & resolution and theory of the State.

Dr. EUN Jaeho is a 'democracy designer' where his professional expertise was acknowledged with his commitment in public consultations at national level during his tenure at the Presidential Committee for National Cohesion (2016-2017) as a director general. Various themes such as Vision 2045 for Korean Nation, Nuclear waste disposal policy etc. have drawn thousands of people for deliberative consensus-building.

Dr. EUN Jaeho is recognized as one of South Korea's leading experts in conflict management and deliberative democracy, and is currently a Public Affairs Vice President of Korea Institute of Public Administration. He holds a Ph.D in Political science from the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan and a Master Degree from the University of Paris X-Nanterre in France.

Politics, Diplomacy and Security
The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States

Status of Inclusive States in Theory of the State and Implementation Strategies

National development of South Korea and the developmental state theory

In 2019, South Korea (hereafter "Korea") celebrated the centennial anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional Government and the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Korea is the only developing country that has achieved full industrialization and democratization simultaneously to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with developed countries. A former recipient of US financial aid (12% of the country's GNP and 73% of its fiscal income), Korea, in 71years, has risen to the world's 11th largest economy and is the 7th country to join the so-called "30-50 club." Let us also look at Korea's status on the democracy index. The Economist has labelled Korea a "fully democratized" country. The remarkable development achieved shortly after the nation transcended its feudal, "predatory" state system and has earned Korea a place at the table of world history.

Although views may vary, there is little disagreement on the view that Korea's globally recognized modernization was attributable to effective state interventions. For over the past 50 years the developmental state theory, in particular, ascribes factors behind the successful development of East Asian countries including Korea are due strong political leadership, a neutral bureaucracy, and outstanding national planning and coordination. The theory also highlights active state interventions as a driver of economic growth.

Can Korea rely on the developmental state model over the next 50 years as it has over the past 50 years? It is now time to ponder which development model will best fit Korea for the future of the millennial generation and Generation Z (who refer to themselves as "digital nomads") and for the survival and prosperity of the country. This is why the exploration of potential development models based on the concept of "stateness" implied in state theories remain a useful vantage point.

Stateness of Korea, an actively exclusive state

The theories of the state refers to research on the nature and traits of the state with a focus on the function and role of the state in a given society and the scope and methods of state interventions. In this context, stateness can refer to how the state interacts with civil society. Dryzek & Dunleavy point out that stateness can be learned by looking at the channels through which the state influences civil society on physical and regulatory fronts. They presented four different stateness models (Table 1) based on two axes: one axis regards the way civil society interests are incorporated into the state; the other axis concerns the role of the state. The interests of civil society can be accommodated, either inclusively or exclusively, and the state can intervene in civil society, either actively or passively (cf. Dryzek & Dunleavy, 2009: 135-140; Yoo, 2010: 36-37, 2011: 255-256).

[Table 1] Stateness Models

	Passive intervention	Active intervention
Exclusive intervention	1. Passive exclusive states (Germany and France)	2. Active exclusive states (Korea, East Asian developmental states, and new liberalism)
Inclusive intervention	3. Passive inclusive states (US)	4. Active inclusive states (Switzerland and Scandinavian countries)

Sources: Dryzek & Dunleavy (2009) and Yoo (2010), modified

The first is the passively exclusive state model where the state intervenes passively to address social issues and incorporates only certain social interests into the state. Good examples are Germany and France in the 1960s and 70s, where the state only incorporated the interests of labor groups and businesses, leaving out many others, which resulted in radical political movements being undertaken by the underrepresented groups.

The second is the actively exclusive state model largely adopted by the developmental states in East Asia, including Korea, where the interests of businesses and capitalists were reflected exclusively in state policies. A majority of new liberalist policies including Thatcherism fall into this category as they actively reflect the interests of capitalists and businesses in policies while actively suppressing the interests of labor groups.

The third model is the passively inclusive state represented by the US. Passively inclusive states use their state power to protect the freedom of individuals and groups and try to ensure different interests are reflected in the state through pluralistic competition. However, states which reflect this model differ from actively inclusive states in that they do not actively protect the interests of individuals and groups.

The fourth model is actively inclusive states that actively intervene to organize the diverse interests of civil society into the state and go one step further to strive to solve social issues through active coordination and arbitration. Good examples are Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries that have well established consensus building processes led by the state. Actively inclusive states often achieve high levels of social integration as they take far more direct and proactive roles in dealing with social issues including labor, environment, welfare, gender and ethics at the state level and coordinating different interests and resolving conflicts.

If the empirical facts about Korea's national development are mapped against the Dryzek & Dunleavy classifications, then it is readily apparent that Korea fits the actively exclusive state model. The high growth in 1960s-80s was the "remarkable" result of the state-led development drive where the state set long-term goals based on private ownership and market discipline, and mobilized and selectively (unevenly) allocated social resources. In other words, behind the "Miracle on the Han River" were strong state autonomy and outstanding state capacity of Korea.

State autonomy refers to the ability of the state to set and implement goals independently, rather than blindly reflecting the interests of civil society to the state (Skocpol 1985:9). One of the institutional characteristics of a developmental state is that state interventions are strategically limited to certain areas of society (Amsden 1989). Korea was no exception in that regard. The state was able to maintain high levels of independence from social forces and interest groups and to enforce policies based on the goals set independently, which resulted in a rapid economic growth. For instance, in 1975-1987, Korea successfully industrialized the heavy and chemical industry by channeling a high portion of government spending into the sector although its total public spending accounted for less than 20% of GDP – an index often used to gauge the level of state interventions – a level much lower than the OECD average.

State capacity refers to the ability to execute officially set goals in the face of practical or potential objections by social groups, or social circumstances (Skocpol 1985:9) and institutional capability concerns capabilities regarding policy-making, legislation, and corruption control and law enforcement. The fact that the Korean government, in the 1970s and 80s, was able to control resource allocation to attain its development goals while neglecting and suppressing the social demand for state intervention in welfare, the environment and democratization serves as an indicator of Korea's state capacity during that period. Likewise, goals set by a developmental state with strong autonomy can be effectively implemented through strong state capacity. It, therefore, can be concluded that state autonomy has to do with the establishment of development goals whereas state capacity determines the ability to deliver those goals. (Yoo, 2011: 255).

Korea experienced the dismantling of the developmental state model after its democratization in 1987 and underwent disruptive changes in terms of its stateness that can be referred to as that of a "post-developmental state." Here, "post-developmental" refers to the transitional period a country experiences when the developmental state model no longer functions as it had previously and socio-political conditions are not yet ripe for a new state model - the competition state, the social investment state, or the Keynesian welfare state - to take root. The result is the degraded autonomy and capacity of the state, an outcome desired by none (Yoo, 2011).

The starting point was, of course, rapid deregulation based on new public management rooted in the new liberalist paradigm. This caused deeper socio-economic bipolarization and social conflicts, resulting in a deteriorating happiness index. Despite being the world's 11th largest economy, in the 2019 World Happiness Report, Korea was ranked 32nd among the 34 OECD countries and 54th among the 156 countries. Falling quality of life (19.3%) was also recognized as a serious social issue next to low fertility and aging population (48.7%) in the "Public awareness survey for a new state model" by Korea Institute of Public Administration (2019). In fact, since 1987 the gap between the haves and the have-nots has widened, creating the unsettling, self-deprecating term "HellJoseon". The 2007 financial crisis hit the Korean economy hard on the hills of its recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The subsequent and persistent economic volatility combined with socio-political changes to cause the younger generation to refer to themselves as the "n-Po (Giveup) Generation" who give upon all hope and scream out "Isaengmang (I am done for in this life)."

This is why Korea needs a new development model. That search can begin with two questions: "Where should we go?" and "How should we get there?" The first question deals with the matter of reorienting the role of the state to achieve socio-political development along with sustainable growth by striking a balance between growth and distribution as well as between innovation and preservation. The second question will help us find ways to break away from low growth as well as social division and animosity and build the foundation for restructuring the state for a better future. That journey must not start with a review of theoretical orientations or normative belief systems, but with a review of the historically structured and socially conditioned state systems of Korea.

A transition from an active exclusive state to an innovative inclusive state

Firstly, "Where should we go?" Korea seems to be transitioning from an active exclusive state to a passive inclusive state. The role of state has weakened since democratization and the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the interests of different social groups have been comprehensively reflected in state affairs. This observation appears even more apparent given the dismantling of the Economic Planning Board that spearheaded national development, the phasing out of five-year economic development plans, and passive, yet multi-faceted efforts to address widening social conflicts.

However, what has been revealed is that Korea still preserves as heritage the institutions and path dependency of a strong developmental state and that the post-development state model lacks restructuring and regime shifting capabilities. Furthermore, despite high social expectations regarding the role of the state, the level of social consensus is low. This means a transition to the American and British forms of the passive inclusive state will incur substantial costs for Korea. If so, rather than reducing the state's role to transform itself into a passive state, which involves a refusal to acknowledge its historical heritage, leveraging the strong role of the state in society that has played out throughout Korea's long history of centralized dynasties spanning over several millennia may prove to be more effective.

In this sense, the active inclusive state model adopted by Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries is a better fit for Korea's development than the pluralistic, passive inclusive state model of the US. Inclusion should mean active inclusion that focuses on enhancing individual capabilities through education and training as well as through the expansion of social welfare. Passively inclusive states provide a minimal social safety net to the underprivileged and help the jobless find their next job. Paul Romer argued that knowledge capital and human capital are the main drivers of indigenous growth while Joseph Stiglitz asserted that the most effective way to ease inequality is a migration to a creative learning society. According to this argument, enhanced individual capabilities will drive technological innovation and productivity gains and will, in turn, enhance group capabilities – the essence of the integrative growth theory.

Moreover, given Korea's unique historical background and current circumstances, Korea needs to set as its "to-be" goal an innovative inclusive state that is active and innovative. This is because Korea's capacity for technological innovation and human capital development weakened under the "predatory" economic system that prevailed during the developmental state period (Sung et al., 2017: 62). This is in line with Acemoglu & Robinson's observation (2012) that predatory political and economic systems tend to stifle technological and human capital innovation and cause an economy to decline. In fact, Korea invested heavily in innovation and recorded substantial quantitative achievements, but is at risk of incurring excessive costs due to innovation-lacking inclusion stemming from inefficient and low-return investments in innovation. On the other hand, the Nordic countries and Switzerland, the most generous welfare states with vibrant economies, have the perfect mix of the level of inclusion and innovation. Being innovative is the source of sustainable growth pursued by an inclusive state.

From the theoretical perspective of the state, the innovative inclusive state model requires migration to a social market economy system enabling sustainable development through inclusion and innovation. Korea may consider experimenting with various models to find the best fit while still under the shadow of the now defunct developmental state model. This change will happen not only on economic front but instead must drive a broader transformation covering economic, political, social and international systems (cf. [Table 2]).

[Table 2] (Post-) Developmental State vs Innovative Inclusive State

Area	Category	(Post-)Developmental State Model	Innovative Inclusive State Model
Politics	Power structure	· Distorted representative democracy and "swirl" power (excessive centralism, psephocracy controlled by an elite, and winner-takes-all majority)	· Harmonious mix of centralization and decentralization through consensus democracy (local autonomy and balanced national development)
	Administrative structure of the government	· Unitary state (monocentrism)	· Federalism (polycentrism)
	Political sovereignty	· Statism (state sovereignty)	· Civic republicanism (popular sovereignty)
	Method of participation	· Representative democracy (spectator politics)	· Pseudo-direct democracy (participatory politics)
	Public administration	· Bureaucracy (bureaucratic efficiency) · Problem-solving/ top-down government	· Democratic public administration (democratic efficiency) · Future-forecasting/ intelligent (platform) government
Economy	Governance	· State and capital	· Collaboration among state, market and society
	Market structure	· Monopoly/ oligopoly by conglomerates and large businesses · New liberalist market economy	· Cooperation among large businesses and small- and mid-sized enterprises and shared growth · Social market economy
	Policy stance	· Grow first and distribute later · Fast follower strategy based on exclusion and emulation	· Virtuous cycle of capabilities, employment and income · Sustainable development strategies focused on inclusion and innovation
Society	Policy stance	· Selective social policies · Inheritance of social privileges and wealth from parents	· Universal social policies · Restoring social ladder through greater fairness and equal opportunities
	Social service delivery	· Provider-centric	· Recipient-centric (lifetime basic livelihood protection, etc.)
	Social safety net	· Survival of the fittest · No one will back you up	· Stronger social integration · Social sustainability · Innovation capabilities nurtured and utilized · Safe, low cost society
Int'l relations	World order	· Realism	· Constructivism
	Policy stance	· Foreign policies based on a nation state system (Cold War regime-based security awareness and alliance-based diplomacy)	· Citizen-centric security regime (comprehensive, common, and collaborative security)
	Global status	· Strong nation built through hostile conflicts and arms race	· Peace nation with soft power

Sources: Sung et al., (2017: 67), Ahn (2018: iv), The Presidential Commission on Policy Planning (2019) and Korea Institute of Public Administration (2019)

A road to an innovative inclusive state

Secondly, "How should we get there?" Once a consensus is reached on the necessity of a new social contract to solve socio-political conflicts over freedom, responsibilities, rights and obligations, the next step is to formulate implementation strategies that will take us to the "to-be." A vision without concrete strategies to manage the transition is nothing but a hollow declaration. Effective transition management requires multiple preconditions: integration of policies for different domains; complementarity of production and welfare regimes; and convergence of social and economic policies, and of social and technological systems. Another requirement is alignment between long-term vision and frontline near-term policies and actions.

To this end, two implementation strategies are needed. The first strategy aims to bring innovation to the government to establish a "platform" government. A platform government focuses on building relationships with diverse groups within a society and creating policies to tackle social challenges through deliberation and collaboration under a shared vision. This will mean a departure from a government system where policies are made unilaterally by central government agencies with the help of a handful of experts, handed down to local governments or enforcement bodies, after which the general public is informed of the said policy changes. Given the severity of social issues including energy transformation, minimum wage, state-sponsored welfare and government-funded projects, there is a pressing need to create and operate a platform for public deliberation and agreement on such issues. Knowledge, experience and infrastructure built in the process will be set and utilized as a "commons", in the form of shared assets. Commons will be accumulated throughout the platform for implementing a new social system and will be used to facilitate the implementation of the system.

The second strategy is to increase social dialogue to reach a consensus. Social dialogue is essential for reducing social costs of conflicts and revitalizing an economy beset by a triple labor market crisis characterized by employment instability, weak income protection and slow productivity gains. Through social dialogue, people should be reminded that restructuring Korea's socio-economic systems in a rapidly changing environment can only be done via concessions and compromises. Social dialogue must take place at multiple levels for different goals: dialogue and compromise between labor and management at the corporate level; introduction of the joint wage system for addressing bipolarization at the industry level; and a new social contract at the national level encompassing labor, management, politicians and other interest groups. Social dialogue can prove valuable in many areas beyond labor. In Switzerland, France and Canada, social dialogue was instrumental in coordinating conflicting interests and values involving legal and regulatory issues and finding a common ground. Such dialogue will also be useful in deriving policy solutions that can support the Fourth Industrial Revolution amid uncertainties and fundamental changes. Furthermore, social dialogue can be broadly used as a deliberation mechanism for preventing and resolving diverse social conflicts and disputes that may arise between the central and local governments, among different regions as well as among different groups. Collective understanding and social consensus, created through social dialogue, on the concept, value and strategies of the innovative inclusive state model will make the transition easier.

An innovative inclusive state can serve as a new state development model, which will replace both the now defunct developmental state model and the interim post developmental state model. Nevertheless, a state development model is a practice-driven model that evolves from practice and is subsequently organized into a theory, historically. For the innovative inclusive state model suggested as an exploratory orientation to be established as a new official state model, the model must be put into practice in a concrete manner and be reoriented continuously as needed. We must remember that every traveled road was once an untraveled one.

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Discussant

MIN Jin

Honorary Professor
Public Administration
Korea National Defense University

Republic of Korea

Professor MIN Jin recognized as one of the nation's leading scholar in public administration and defense management. He had been served as a professor and Vice President of the KNDU. Currently he is a honorary professor of KNDU. He is also an adviser on the research problem of the Korea Public Administration Institute.

During his 37 year service as a professor of the KNDU he educated lots of military officers and public servants. As a prominent scholar he published several books, like Theory and Practice in Organization and Management(6th ed., 2018), Policy Management(2016) etc. And he had played a role as a military educational administrator through he was in charge of Dean and Vice President of KNDU. And he served as a President of Korea Society of Organization Studies.

Before Joining the professor, he was a junior researcher of Bureau of Legislative Research, Korea National Assembly Library. After he got Bachelors degree at Konkuk university, he got masters degree and Phd. degree of Public Administration at Seoul National University. He made a research as a visiting professor at Georgia University and Florida University, USA.

Discussant

KIM Jung Hai

Head
Government Research Bureau
Korea Institute of Public Administration

Republic of Korea

Dr. KIM Jung Hai, an expert in the field of Public Management, has carried out professional research in the fields of public management such as organizational diagnosis & management, regulatory innovation, and contracting-out.

Dr. KIM Jung Hai is currently a head of Government Research Bureau at Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) where she involves in research on public management, government innovation, regulatory innovation, evaluation, social cohesion, disaster & safety.

Dr. KIM Jung Hai has been an Advisory Board member of the Fair Trade Commission for 16 years since 2005, and won the Presidential National Package for her contribution to improve the fair trade system in Korea. In addition, she was honored with the Ministerial Award for her contribution to the fair economy and improve the organizational culture of the Fair Trade Commission.

Dr. KIM Jung Hai has served as an advisory member of the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Unification since 2012.

Politics, Diplomacy and Security

The Future of Innovative, Inclusive States

Discussant

LEE Changwon

Senior Research Fellow
Korea Labor Institute

Republic of Korea

Dr. LEE Changwon, a senior research fellow at Korea Labor Institute, served as a director of Center for Wage and Job Research. Dr. LEE Changwon served as a member of Public Interest Committee at Minimum Wage Council and a chairperson Local Organizing Committee, International Labour and Employment Relations (ILERA) World Congress. He is currently a member of Presidential Commission on Policy Planning.

Dr. LEE Changwon received Master and Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of Chicago, United States.

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